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Abstract 
Norway is among a handful of countries with an explicit policy to promote carbon capture and storage (CCS) at both national 
and international levels. This paper investigates the internal and external driving forces behind Norway's efforts to advance 
CCS as a global climate change mitigation option. The ambition is twofold: First, a mapping of Norway’s public CCS policy 
with emphasis on the externally directed efforts is offered based on interviews and document studies. Second, it is explained 
how CCS foreign policy was chosen as a prioritized means of climate change mitigation policy in Norway. The study is 
conducted with the application of Foreign Policy Analysis. From the outside-in perspective, the international climate regime 
is emphasized. From the inside-out perspective, bureaucratic politics is in focus. It is found that the winning coalition behind 
the domestic CCS agenda also directed CCS foreign policy design and implementation. The CCS foreign policy offers a 
means to fulfil Norway’s regime obligations on terms that harmonize the potential conflict of maintaining a political 
economy reliant on petroleum exports with a credible climate change mitigation policy. It is shown how technology R&D for 
global use has been a key ingredient in this context. It is also explored how the CCS foreign policy was materialized with the 
means of official development assistance and other funding mechanisms.  
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Nomenclature 
4KI  Four Kingdom Initiative 
BECCS Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
CCM Clean Capture Mongstad 
CCS  Carbon Capture and Storage 
CCUS Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage 
WB CCS TF World Bank Carbon Capture and Storage Trust Fund 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CSLF Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum 
EEA  European Economic Area  
EERP European Economic Recovery Plan 
EUETS European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
FPA   Foreign Policy Analysis 
GCCSI Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute 
GHG Greenhouse Gases 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MoE  Ministry of the Environment  
    (also covering 2013 name change to Ministry of Climate and Environment) 
MoF  Ministry of Finance 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
MPE  Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
NER300 New Entrants Reserve 300 
NSBTF North Sea Basin Task Force 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NZEC  Near Zero Emission Coal  
ODA  Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPM Office of the Prime Minister 
REDD+ Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in Developing countries and     
  carbon stock conservation, enhancement, reforestation and afforestation 
TCM Technology Center Mongstad 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WB CCS TF World Bank Carbon Capture and Storage Trust Fund 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The need for widespread CCS application as a means to mitigate GHG emissions causing anthropogenic climate 
change has been reaffirmed by the latest IPCC and IEA assessments [1, 2]. While global CCS deployment in various 
forms2 has been recognized as vital within most two-degree scenarios, actual implementation has to date been 
 
 
2 Such as related to EOR; other CCUS and; BECCS or other forms of CO2 capture and storage with prolonged avoided emissions to the 
atmosphere 
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limited [3]. Norway is among a handful of countries with an explicit policy to promote CCS at both national and 
international levels.  
This paper illuminates the internal and external driving forces behind Norwegian governments' efforts to 
advance CCS as a global climate change mitigation option since 2008.The substantive objective is twofold. First, an 
updated mapping of Norway’s extensive public CCS policy is offered, with an emphasis on the externally directed 
efforts. Second, it is sought explained how the winning coalition behind the domestic CCS agenda has been able to 
make CCS part of Norwegian foreign policy. This has taken CCS into new policy arenas, including international 
climate change negotiations, development assistance, Norway's policy towards the EU and high-level diplomacy in 
dedicated bilateral and multilateral forums. For these purposes, Foreign Policy Analysis is applied within the fields 
of climate change and CCS policy. Few contributions are available from this perspective to date [4]. 
Prioritization of CCS is part of a wider range of externally oriented policies designed to harmonize Norway's 
climate and energy targets. The potential conflict between the maintenance of a political economy reliant on 
petroleum production and exports and a credible GHG mitigation policy is Norway’s climate political Gordian knot. 
At the domestic arena, CCS has been linked to this agenda for almost three decades [5]. The relatively high marginal 
costs of abatement in Norway are keys to understanding Norwegian governments' strategy on climate policy. Based 
on the principle of cost-effectiveness in mitigation action, Norway has positioned itself as a firm supporter of the 
market-based mechanisms of the UNFCCC, ideally under a globally binding regime. In addition, Norway has 
worked actively towards a mechanism for reduced deforestation (REDD+) as part of the international climate 
regime [6, 7].  
Previous studies of Norway's national CCS efforts since the 1990s, found the CCS concept to function as a 
“technological glue” to reconcile opposing parties of the energy-climate divide in the debate over the eventual 
construction of natural gas fired power plants in Norway [8]. As domestic innovation policy, CCS R&D in Norway 
has been pointed to as a preferred climate political solution when industrial interests have been confronted with 
potential economic sanctions as a means to curb emissions from these sources [9].  
The literature has shed light on the function of CCS for political goal attainment in various polities [10-13]. The 
importance of winning coalitions of actors to shape policy development and implementation stands out as an insight 
from these studies [11, 14, 15]. While non-specific climate policy measures have been insufficient for CCS 
implementation in most cases, deliberate public policies in the domains of innovation, regulations, and even 
implementation of energy and industry policies, have been critical factors for the political and practical potentials of 
CCS in industrialized countries [12, 16, 17]. Others have noted that CCS, traditionally a highly specialized epistemic 
community, over time has moved into mainstream political discourse in some instances [18, 19]. At the conceptual 
level, the political feasibility of CCS in certain political economic circumstances has been explained by path 
dependency effects as a state of carbon-lock-in [20]. As literature on the policy and politics of CCS remains a 
evolving, although limited, field, several avenues of interest remain uncharted to date. Despite the apparent need for 
CCS deployment in emerging economies, few have studied the prospects for CCS in these countries [21, 22]. 
Similarly, few studies have addressed states’ externally oriented policies to advance CCS internationally – that is 
CCS as foreign policy. The present study is a contribution to rectify this state of offering. 
 
1.1  CCS as Environmental Foreign Policy: Analytical approach and methods 
This is a single case study of foreign policy output at the case level exploring the choice of CCS foreign policy in 
terms of climate policy output in Norway. FPA is a useful analytical tool since it offers a broad approach to 
explaining externally directed policies, using both outside-in and inside-out explanations. These include the external 
(international) and internal (domestic) environments of the state, as well as attributes of the executive government 
(bureaucratic politics). Herein lies the potential to account for the framework conditions and motivations which may 
otherwise fall between or overlap set political systems: “Thinking about foreign policy focuses our attention on 
interactions among domestic political preferences and positions governments take in negotiations” [23: 8]. As such, 
FPA provides a framework as to how decision making and implementing processes may be studied [24]. The aim is 
to identify robust causal explanations based on empirical process tracing and guided by relevant theory at the 
respective levels of analysis [25]. 
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Climate policymakers seek on the one hand to adhere to international commitments while simultaneously paying 
attention to what is feasible within the domestic political system [26-30]. From the outside-in perspective, the 
UNFCCC represents an international framework condition for Norwegian policymakers. We will look into how 
successive Norwegian governments have attempted to argue for CCS on terms of its potential to fulfill Norway´s 
obligations under the international climate change regime. At the same time, Norway has worked actively to adjust 
the same regime and also other international treaties to allow for CCS as a legitimate mitigation option [31, 32].  
At the national political level, emphasis is put on the development and execution of CCS foreign policy among 
agencies of the executive government. The assumption is that various ministries of the government direct sector 
interests that are partially overlapping, representing domestic interest formation at large. The aggregated outcome of 
such bureaucratic politics is what constitutes the state's foreign policy and national interests [26, 33, 34]. Key 
agencies in focus in this regard are the MPE, MoE, and OPM. In this political space, between domestic and 
international restraints and commitments, the climate political room of maneuvering will be identified. This room of 
maneuvering is the space within which the available actions and strategies are found. It is from this repertoire of 
means that action is composed, based on the prevailing preferences of policymakers. This line of reasoning is 
illustrated in figure 1 below.  
 
 
In addition to studies of existing academic literature and public documents (state budgets, white papers and 
ministerial archives), data gathering is based on eleven interviews with representatives of the executive branches of 
government, current and former policymakers, industry, research institutions, NGOs and others that have been 
parties or close to the relevant processes (identities are kept anonymous, see appendix for institutional affiliations). 
The present accounts are based on a minimum of two informants’ independent reporting or one written and one oral 
source of information. Citations are translated from Norwegian by the author.  The following chapter (2) maps the 
evolution of CCS as climate policy in Norway in order to identify and place the CCS foreign policy in context. 
Based on the analytical framework presented above, Norway’s CCS foreign policy is thereafter analyzed in the 
subsequent chapter (3). The conclusive chapter underlines key findings and proposes alleys of further inquiry (4).  
 
Figure 1. The FPA approach to the climate political room of maneuvering 
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2. Norway's evolving CCS engagement as climate policy: The four pillars 
 
It is here suggested that Norway's CCS policy evolved around four distinct pillars in terms of implemented 
policies and their effects, whereof the fourth constitutes Norway’s CCS foreign policy. These pillars were arguably 
materialized following changes in the climate political room of maneuvering in Norway and prompted by changes in 
the scope and aims of the government’s policy:  Initially in the 1990s, Norway’s climate policies were aimed at the 
national level using directed sector-wide economic sanctions. Later, a principle adjustment came with a shift 
towards cost-effectiveness across economic sectors and on a global scale. With the Kyoto protocol, Norway and its 
negotiating block eventually succeeded in having an international regime that accepted the approach of a global 
scope in mitigation action [38, 39]. As such, the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol relieved the conflict 
potential related to abatement costs at the national level in Norway. In 2012, Norway also signed onto the 2012-
2020 Kyoto II period [40]. When analyzed on the basis of domestic politics, the dynamics in Norway’s climate 
policies have been explained as political solutions that not only accommodated Norway’s mitigation targets and 
international commitments, but also key interests administered by members of domestic winning coalitions notably 
including those of the petroleum industry [7, 35-37]. As we shall see, with these framework conditions in place, 
technology development, such as CCS R&D, gained traction as a viable climate political approach in Norway [7, 9]. 
The first out of the four CCS pillars was the deployment of CO2 re-injection and permanent storage at the 
Sleipner and Snøhvit gas fields. For Sleipner 1996, this was an all-industry adjustment to the national CO2-tax 
regime introduced in 1991, a result of Norway’s first climate policy. It stated that Norway’s GHG emissions was to 
be “stabilized at 1989 level by the year 2000” and that Norway would lead by example in mitigation action [7, 36]. 
In 2004, the Snøhvit project was set-up for CO2 separation and storage mainly due to the CO2 tax regime [5]. As 
natural gas processing plants, Sleipner and Snøhvit were both fitted with gas separation facilities for industrial 
needs. The introduction of CCS in these cases was thus primarily a question of permanent storage. When operating 
at capacity, the two plants sequester 1.4 MtCO2/year, accounting for  >2% of Norway's annual emissions [43]. 
Sleipner, and later Snøhvit's, important political contribution was to demonstrate that CO2 storage could reconcile 
environmental and petroleum interests in that natural gas production could be maintained at significantly lowered 
GHG emissions. The Sleipner and Snøhvit experiences contributed significantly to the standing of CCS as a climate 
political solution in Norway: Sequestration actually worked. 
A parallel argument for CCS was brought on land and into the “gas power conflict”; the controversy over the 
eventual construction of natural gas fired power plants. During the 1990s and early 2000s, industrial actors, tempted 
by the idea of supplying mainland industry with abundant natural gas power, faced environmentalist interests. 
Advocates of the latter pointed to Norway's national climate political obligations, arguing that natural gas fired 
plants would unacceptably contribute to carbon footprint of Norway's electricity mix [44]. It was the manifestation 
of the climate political Gordian knot and CCS came to the rescue. Carried forward by an alliance of industry, NGOs, 
labor unions, and with backing in parliament, CCS attracted broad political appeal as “technological glue” for its 
promise of “CO2 free” power plants [5]. For now, carbon sequestration in Norway was a proven win-win solution to 
a national problem, capable of harmonizing industrial and environmental concerns and interest groups.  This is 
further discussed in chapter 4 below. 
The introduced drift towards global cost-effectiveness in Norway’s climate policy required a refined approach to 
CCS as a mitigation option too. This prompted the second pillar of Norway's CCS policy, namely a dedicated public 
CCS R&D programme to make CCS technologies a cost-effective alternative. When the Labor government in 2000 
allowed non-CCS power plants, it as meditative action established a public fund for CCS technology R&D, giving 
birth to the dedicated CLIMIT CCS R&D programme [44]. Similarly, after the coalition government in 2013 
cancelled the CCM full-scale project, funding for CLIMIT was boosted [45]. The initial aim of the R&D programme 
was to enable technology developments that would make CCS a feasible option for the purpose of gas fired power 
plants. CLIMIT’s mandate was from 2010 expanded to cover coal fired and industrial sources, also beyond Norway 
[46]. This second pillar underlines the important function of technology R&D in Norway’s CCS policy. The promise 
of technology development has increasingly been linked to Norway’s climate policy at large and to the global 
diffusion of CCS technology; to Norwegian CCS foreign policy.  
The third pillar of the Norwegian government’s CCS efforts came with the government’s significant ownership 
and participation in CCS projects at natural gas fired power plants in Norway. Crucial activities in this record were 
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the government’s remarkably deep involvement into the 2009-aborted full-scale Kårstø project, the 2012-operational 
CO2-capture TCM and related 2013-aborted full-scale CCM projects. As shall be discussed, these efforts reflected 
the coalition government of 2005’s commitments to natural gas fired power plants with CCS. The TCM-CCM 
projects, by the prime minister labeled ”Norway’s moon landing” for its technological complexity and novel 
innovation, was the result of a risk minimizing strategy: In step one, TCM was to be built for the development of 
affordable, reliable capture technologies. In step two, the CCM would sequester CO2 emissions from the Mongstad 
plant as a contribution to reduce national emissions [47].  Together, these manifested the new aims of the CCS 
effort: In light of the “gas power conflict”, to contribute to lowered from sources in emissions in Norway, and now 
equally; to contribute to the development of cost-effective CCS technologies for global use [48: 9]. 
As the fourth and final pillar; in 2008, an explicit CCS foreign policy found its way into Norway's climate 
political toolbox. The relevancy of CCS in an international context was highlighted in two respects: The potential 
contribution of CCS technology development to facilitate the formation of the international climate regime post-
2012, and CCS as a prioritized “environmental technology” in the field of ODA. An important milestone for the 
launch of Norway’s CCS foreign policy was the 2009 Bergen CCS conference, where the Norwegian Prime and 
Foreign ministers hosted international high-level participants in the energy and climate fields [49]. The priorities and 
portfolio of this pillar is further described in sub-chapter 2.1.  
Following the 2013 cancellation of the CCM and national elections, Norway’s new government of 2014 decided 
to revise Norway´s entire CCS strategy. While the particular policy instruments are still under development, an 
explicit position is already taken on the ambition of the effort.  The “materialization of a full-scale CCS project by 
2020” is a stated goal combined with a “broad initiative for a cost-effective technology for capture and storage of 
CO2” [50: 61]. CCS materialization is no longer limited to relate to the function of CCS applied on natural gas 
power plants in Norway. In fact, it is not specified whether the CCS project to be materialized should be located in 
Norway at all.  Instead, the CCS 2020 goal is argued on the grounds of CCS as a global solution to a global 
problem, which is that of reconciling the two-degrees target and global need for fossil energy and heavy industry 
[48].  The current government regards CCS as a crucial global mitigation option to which Norway has comparative 
advantage given its plus 20 years’ CCS legacy, as expressed in the four pillars briefly described above [51].  
 
 
Figure 2. Norway’s CCS policy pillars 1993-2014 
 
I: Industrial CO2-separation and storage 
Industrial response to 
CO2-tax:  CO2 re-
injection at Sleipner 
and Snøhvit
II: Public CCS R&D programme 
CCStechnology
development:CLIMIT,
Gassnovaestablished.
III: Public domestic CCS implementation
Gassnova with new 
mandate. Kårstø,TCM 
and CCM
IV: CCS Foreign 
policy
Bi- and multilateral 
CCS diplomacy; 
support to civil society 
promoting CCS, 
contributions to full-
scale and pilot projects
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2.1 Mapping Norway’s CCS foreign policy 
2008 was a landmark year for the development of Norway’s CCS foreign policy.3 The Norwegian parliament 
requested the government to develop and implement an “action plan for the international work to promote CCS as a 
climate change mitigation option” [52]. This was part of the cross-parliamentary “First Climate Settlement”, where 
Norway’s overall climate change mitigation targets and means were set towards 2020 and beyond [53]. A similar 
“Second Climate Settlement” in 2012 reaffirmed the same goals, emphasizing the importance of the international 
CCS effort: “(…) Norway shall be a country leading the way for international acceptance for CCS as a necessary 
mitigation option. Norway has built up a significant position in this field. A strengthened commitment to CCS 
internationally, in particular in countries that are expected to experience high economic growth (…), will be 
especially important. The materialization of real demonstration projects can make a significant contribution to 
technology development and, over time, also towards the commercialization of the technology. In this way, 
preparations are undertaken for CCS to become an important mitigation option that leads to real, global mission 
cuts.” [40: 15]  
The objectives of Norway’s CCS foreign policy are formulated for stepwise implementation. An objective 
common for all steps of implementation is to communicate the need for CCS deployment in context of the two-
degrees target.  In the short and medium term, 2008-2015, Norway should actively contribute to i) international 
mechanisms for the implementation of CCS; ii) have CCS included as part of the post-2012 climate regime; iii) EU 
and international framework and regulations for CO2 storage; iv) map potential cooperation projects in selected 
countries and regions, and later consider to support implementation of mapped projects. In the long term, transfer of 
technology and experience from Norwegian CCS projects should be prioritized. It is also stated that these 
interventions should be financed through ODA as the “main source of funding” [52]. In addition to the above, I also 
add the externally oriented argument for the TCM and the CLIMIT R&D programme to the list; Norway sought 
through its domestic efforts to contribute the development of globally replicable, affordable CCS technologies [48]. 
The relationship between Norway’s domestic and external CCS activities is elaborated below. 
By 2014, Norway’s CCS foreign policy may be grouped into four thematic categories: i) Efforts to include CCS 
into the CDM of the UNFCCC; ii) contributions to full-scale and pilot projects in the EU, China and South Africa; 
iii) financial support to global and European civil society promoting CCS acceptance and favorable regulations and; 
iv) bi- and multilateral “CCS diplomacy” at the ministerial and technical levels. Table 1 below lists key aspects of 
Norway’s international CCS efforts within the four categories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Although 2008 was the year of the formalization of the CCS foreign policy action plan, several of the listed portfolio items were initiated earlier  
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Table1. Norway’s CCS foreign policy portfolio 2008-2014 
 
Thematic category Forum or channels of 
implementation 
Key activities or channels of implementation 
 
 Inclusion of CCS into the 
CDM of the UNFCCC 
UNFCCC negotiations  
and UNFCCC secretariat 
 
DNV 
 
 
ECN 
UNFCCC negotiations, sponsored workshops and “capacity 
building” among convention parties [54]  .  
 
“CCS in CDM in Africa” status assessment project in 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola [55]  
 
CCS in CDM in Africa, South Africa CCS Centre [56] 
Contributions to pilot and 
full-scale implementation 
EEA Grants  
 
 
NZEC 
CCS implementation in Poland and Romania [57-59] 
CCS R&D in Czech Republic [60] 
 
Pilot CCS implementation in China with EU [40] 
 
 WB CCSTF Pilot CCS implementation in South Africa with UK [61] 
 
Financial support to civil 
society, capacity building 
and technical conferences 
Civil Society support  
 
 
WB CCSTF 
Global: ZERO, Bellona Foundation, GCCSI, IEA, UNIDO.  
EU: ZERO, Bellona [48, 62-64] 
 
World Bank capacity building activities in  
10 developing countries [65]    
 
 CCS diplomacy beyond 
UNFCCC 
Dedicated multilateral 
forums and regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bilateral CCS diplomacy  
(selection) 
4 Kingdom Initiative [66] 
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum  
Clean Energy Ministerial  
North Sea Basin Task Force [48] 
Bergen High-Level CCS Conference [49] 
OSPAR convention 
IMO, London Protocol [13] 
 
MoU with UK [67] 
MoU with US [68] 
MoU with South Africa [69] 
Foreign stations’ efforts 
 
 
As a technology neutral regime, the UNFCCC leaves the choice of mitigation options to the convention parties. 
The CDM mechanism, however, had a more limited set of accepted activities based on its methodological 
guidelines. The global standing of CCS would be reinforced if it were allowed into the CDM. CCS was eventually 
included in the CDM in 2010 after extensive negotiation among the Kyoto Protocol parties [70] . CCS also found its 
way to the ODA budget and thus increased the footprint of CCS in the MFA’s portfolio of climate related activities 
beyond the function of diplomatic facilitation. These ODA activities were mainly aimed towards CCS “capacity 
building” and “ technology transfer” in developing countries. Also a World Bank trust fund was initiated by Norway 
to this end, primarily funded by ODA [71]. The World Bank gained an agency within the CCS agenda that was 
helpful in order to build international support among developing countries, in particular for the purpose of allowing 
CCS into the CDM. At the regional level, a priority was to promote joint CO2 storage solutions in the North Sea 
among regional partners, notably with the UK, Dutch and German governments and industry [72]. This required 
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modifications of the OSPAR and London Protocol marine pollution agreements. Within the EU, significant 
Norwegian funding was offered Eastern-European states as part of the 2009-2014 “Norway and EEA grants”, which 
are part of Norway’s obligations under the agreement regulating access to the European Economic Area [73].  
Notably, some EUR 180 million in Norway/ EEA grants were offered Polish and Romanian full-scale CCS project 
[57, 58, 74]. In terms of support for civil society, Norwegian NGOs Bellona and Zero Foundation received funding 
with a European and a global mandate to promote CCS. Funding also reached international organizations 
preoccupied with the provision of epistemic terms, such as the IEA, GCCSI, UNIDO and UNFCCC secretariat, 
which have delivered international CCS road maps, workshops and conferences. For the 2008-2014 period, some 
EUR 200 million was set-aside for the purposes of the international CCS portfolio. While this externally oriented 
budget in its own right represents significant resources, it amounts, however, to less than 10% of Norwegian 
budgeted funding to domestic CCS activities over the same period [47].  
 
 
3  Explaining Norwegian CCS foreign policy- 2008-2014 
 
When applying the foreign policy analytical framework introduced above, how may the external projection of 
Norway´s CCS policies 2008-2014 be explained? Starting with the outside-in perspective, this chapter provides an 
analysis of the phenomenon under scrutiny. 
 
3.1 Outside-in: Steady course through a dynamic global environment  
 
During the period Norway developed its CCS foreign policy, the international context shifted significantly. 
Initially, CCS won acclaim among the international community. At the ministerial level, the CSLF, launched by the 
US in 2003, gave CCS high-level attention [75]. At heads-of-state level, the G8 leaders in 2005 stated strong support 
for CCS as a legitimate and necessary mitigation option [76]. In policy practice, the EU followed up by providing 
incentives for CCS implementation and a regulatory framework [77-79]. Policymakers had epistemic support in the 
IPCC, IEA and the Stern Review, all underlining the importance of CCS as a bridging technology towards the two-
degree target [80-82]. By 2008, Norway’s CCS foreign policy was seemingly on top of the international climate 
political wave.  
What later happened, however, struck the international CCS agenda severely.  As expected, several countries 
were skeptical towards CCS as a mitigation option under the CDM – reportedly for reasons of safety concerns but 
also for claims of CCS being a blind alley imposed by the global North obstructing the road towards “sustainability” 
[15, 83, 84]. These hurdles were eventually overcome, with CCS included into the CDM of the UNFCCC in 2010 
[85, 86]. It was finally a legitimate mitigation option within the only functioning mechanism set up to promote 
international “climate technology” transfer. Meanwhile, other more important obstacles towards global CCS 
acceptance and implementation had arisen. For one, the UNFCCC negotiations stalemated in 2009 and the expected 
post-2012 regime was delayed [87]. As a critical undercurrent, the 2008 economic downturn effectively discouraged 
many policymakers from bearing the risks and costs of specific CCS flagship projects or sufficient incentive 
structures. In the EU, the policy tools implemented to move CCS deployment forward, notably the NER300, 
EUETS, and EEPR, were eventually proven inadequate [88].  
Despite the obstacles CCS faced at the regional and international level, Norway did not shift course. In 2010, 
fresh funding for CCS implementation was offered Eastern European states under the EEA Grants and also ODA 
funds were repeatedly allocated for the purposes of CCS “readiness” in developing countries. As late as of 
November 2013, Norway allocated EUR 2 million to a 2017 pilot project in South Africa.  In short, Norway’s CCS 
foreign policy was maintained throughout varying international currents throughout the covered period. However, 
informants close to policymakers report that international CCS implementation was less common on the Norwegian 
ministers´ talking points under bilateral and multilateral meetings after 2012. Instead of pointing at the shifts at the 
international level as a reason, this is explained by the developments of Norway's CCS efforts at home, as shall be 
pursued in the following section. 
In context of the UNFCC, Norway's CCS foreign policy may be interpreted as a means for Norway to honor its 
regime obligations on terms that harmonize with its petroleum exports oriented political economy. Hence, having 
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CCS accepted under the UNFCCC fits well with Norway’s views on the importance of CCS  as tool needed to 
achieve the regime’s overall objective and for post-Kyoto regime formation. But also in an alternative perspective, 
independent of a globally binding regime, focus on specific mitigation options rather than the desired carbon cap 
end state, could yield significant mitigation results. Some states have taken this “action approach” in their focus on 
“short lived climate forcers” and “REDD+” [89-91]. Norway’s focus on CCS could thus contribute to “problem 
solving results” within a weaker regime or in a stretched out phase of regime formation. From the inside-out 
perspective, however, it would be highly negative for the Norwegian government if its domestic CCS efforts, most 
notably at Mongstad, were not recognized as legitimate mitigation action. In such a situation dismissal would not 
happen explicitly – but through other countries’ lack of replication of Norway’s supposed CCS innovations. 
Demand for capture technology, a foreseen business opportunity, would not increase and CO2 from continental 
Europe would hardly find its way to Norwegian North Sea reservoirs.   
 
3.2 Inside-out: The TCM fallback position and CCS foreign policy 
 
As argued above, Norway’s initial CCS policies were designed mainly as an instrument to harmonize the climate 
political Gordian knot, where the “gas power conflict” particularly manifested the existing cleavages.  Early CCS 
practice was the outcome of the domestic political system in the sense that political opposing parties in the “gas 
power conflict” throughout the late 1990s and 2000s had to govern together in various constellations. Common 
ground was often found thanks to the promise of CCS in different forms, such as scaled-up R&D [41, 44]. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this implies that there was no single, long-term “master plan” behind Norway’s CCS policy pillars of 
the first decades. Instead, implemented policy was the result of a project per project based political struggle for 
solutions that would accommodate winning coalitions of actors as contextualized by “the gas power conflict.” 
Hence, the Kårstø and TCM-CCM projects resulted from of political struggle among the political parties in 
government. The government had the stance that no non-CCS plants would be built while powerful political 
decision-makers and industrial actors (notably Statoil, trade unions and the ruling Labor party) were still in support 
of non-CCS plants. As a compromise, the power plants were built and the government was to bear costs and risks 
related to a retrofitting a CCS plant to the operational Mongstad industrial site [48, 92-96]. The state’s direct 
involvement in the TCM-CCM undertaking was the ad-hoc solution to a dire situation. In the Mongstad case, the 
Labor party supported Statoil’s intent to build a new power plant. Coalition partner in government, the Socialist Left 
party, could not accept this. The political compromise reached was one of risk mitigation, in that the TCM for the 
purpose of capture technology development was built first, and the CCM, for the purpose permanent storage from 
the Mongstad plant, was to follow [92, 94]. While the TCM was operational from 2012, the CCM plan was 
abandoned due to high costs in 2013 [97]. With TCM being the principal and “only” Mongstad result, technology 
development became an even more important argument. Following the line of reasoning behind the principle of 
global cost-effectiveness in Norwegian climate policy, the case for curbing national emissions from CCS at was 
Mongstad weakened.  
What remained was the importance of the internationally oriented technology development effort undertaken at 
the TCM, what I label the “TCM fallback position”. The output of Norway’s CCS policy was no longer a means to 
lower national emissions and demonstrating a full-scale plant, but rather technology development for a global 
constituency. As for the validity of the international CCS argument, a CCS foreign policy promoting the case for 
global CCS use was a prerequisite. From the above, one important insight stands out: Fostered by the “gas power 
conflict”, it was the commitment to curbing domestic emissions that was the initial driving force of the CCS agenda 
in Norway. Yet, for CCS to function as climate policy in Norway, technology development for the international 
scene is what has actually proved necessary and a sufficient argument to broker political solutions. R&D served the 
purpose as “technological glue” in the “gas power conflict” and later fitted the case for global CCS deployment.  
This is the technology shift in Norway’s CCS policy, one that could also be labeled the CCS foreign policy shift: 
The technology to be developed was now mainly meant for application outside Norway. This shift is evident in at 
least two ways. The government in its white paper, “Full scale CO2-handling” of 2010 (St. Meld. No. 9 2010-2011), 
put emphasis on the international objectives of its CCS policy while downplaying the importance of the CCM. 
Parliament, too, as part of the Second Climate Settlement of 2012 lowered its national ambitions. Here, the 
government was instructed to look into the opportunities for “CO2 value chains in Norway” without further 
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commitments, while announcing a “strengthening” of the ongoing international efforts. This is by my informants 
explained as when “the realities of CCS sunk in.” By  2012, it had proven difficult to succeed with the CCM as an 
effective full-scale project and the international wind was no longer blowing the CCS direction. The technology 
shift, highlighted by the TCM fallback position and the foreign policy agenda, was the remaining CCS policy 
output. To place the CCS foreign policy pillars in context, table 3 highlights selected milestones of Norwegian CCS 
and climate policy.  
 
 
Table 3. A summary of key aspects of Norway’s CCS efforts in the context of climate political macro drifts 
 
Time period  Overall climate policy 
objective 
System scope, 
preferred solutions 
Instruments introduced in 
relation to CCS 
Selected CCS milestones 
1989-1996 Stabilize Norway’s 
emissions at 1989 level by 
2000 [42] 
 
National, 
Lead by example [98] 
Carbon tax  Sleipner operational 1996 
 
1996-2008 Contribute to the objective 
of the UNFCC [99] 
 
 
 
 
Global,  
cost-effectiveness 
within cap 
 
Technology 
development [7] 
 
CCS as technological 
glue at national level 
Domestic, regional and global 
quota markets  
 
 
Gas power conflict: Shifting 
governments had shifting policies 
towards natural gas fired power 
plants [44] 
 
 
CLIMIT 2000 
 
Concessions for non-CCS 
plants 2000, 2002 
 
Gassnova 2004 
 
Kårstø full-scale 2005. 
Later cancelled. 
 
TCM and CCM 2006, 2007 
 
2008-2012 The First Climate 
Settlement: 70% of 1990 
levels by 2020 and 2050 
carbon neutral [53] 
 
As above. 
 
 
Climate change 
development 
assistance 
Regional and global flexible 
mechanisms; EU ETS, CDM. 
 
Norway’s global mitigation 
efforts: CCS, REDD+, “Energy+” 
[100] 
 
International CCS strategy 
2008 
 
CCS as ODA and EEA 
 
 
2012- The Second Climate 
Settlement:  Previous 
target reaffirmed [40].  
As above but lowered 
ambitions for a global 
regime post 2020.  
 
 
 
Up-scale of domestic technology 
fund, including CLIMIT 
 
TCM operational 2012 
 CCM cancelled 2013 [101] 
 
Feasibility study for CCS 
projects beyond CCM and 
Kårstø 2012   
 
2013- A “strengthening” of the 
Climate Settlement as part 
of the new Government’s 
initial declaration [50] 
As above   Ambition of a 
materialization of a full-
scale CCS project by 2020 
[50] 
 
Revision of entire CCS 
policy 2013 [51] 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Bureaucratic politics:  Foreign Policy at the hands of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy: CCS as a national 
interest 
 
Since the state seeks to fulfill its international obligations on terms that are acceptable or even appealing at the 
domestic level, multiple arguments are combined to attract what may establish winning coalitions of actors behind 
policy. In this case, these arguments include the importance of CCS in the context of the global two-degree target, 
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business opportunities from CCS technology exports, opportunities from regional CO2 storage in the North Sea, 
CCS, bilateral development opportunities and more. A political economic argument was precisely put by the then 
minister of Foreign Affairs when addressing the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association in 2011: “The long term 
attraction of natural gas in a Europe underway towards sustainable energy solutions requires success in CCS, 
nothing less.” [102]  
At the level of bureaucratic politics, the development and implementation of Norway's CCS foreign policy is one 
where CCS as a topic of national energy policy, within the MPE’s mandate [13, 36], expanded and migrated into 
new arenas beyond those of “energy and petroleum” [33].  CCS became a topic of the multilateral climate change 
negotiations, development assistance policy, regional economic cooperation, and international innovation policy. 
Indeed, CCS became part of high-level diplomacy and foreign policy in various constellations.  The grip of the MPE 
however, has persisted throughout this expansion. It’s section for “Climate, Industry and Technology” has led 
Norway’s CCS foreign policy both in terms of budget allocations and political priorities. Since 2008, the 
international CCS policy was, according to my informants, developed and implemented in close cooperation 
between the OPM and civil servants of the MPE. In this phase, the Center party political leadership of the MPE was 
not participating proactively. Instead, the prime minister and his team from the Labor party were engaged together 
with the MPE bureaucrats. In this process, the MFA was a facilitator rather than a provider of terms. The MFA 
sought for multilateral participation at the Bergen conference, for diplomatic contributions at relevant Foreign 
Service stations and, most importantly, for the ODA and EEA chapters. Surprisingly, but in line with the argument 
of the MFAs constrained agency, CCS is not even mentioned in the MFA’s own relevant white papers of 2009 and 
2011; “Climate, conflict, capital – Norwegian development policy in a changing room of maneuvering” and 
“Towards a greener development – On the relations between environmental and development policy”. The 
secondary role of the MFA is also underlined in that the MPE holds Norway’s seat in the multilateral CCS forums 
and that the current revision of Norway’s CCS strategy reportedly is undertaken largely without the involvement of 
the MFA. The MoE has even less control over the priorities and events within the portfolio of what is “a cornerstone 
in our climate policy”, in the words of a previous Minister of Foreign Affairs [102]. Its domestic role has historically 
been to administer political steered allowances to emit CO2. On the international level Norway’s UNFCCC 
delegation is headed by the MoE, while a representative of the MPE leads the negotiations tracks related to CCS.  
The prominent role of the MPE in all CCS foreign policy is contrasted by the organization of other Norwegian 
international climate policy programmes. Examples are the International Energy and Climate Initiative and the 
International Climate and Forest Initiatives, both ODA funded, which are led by the MFA and MoE, respectively. 
This is a consequence of the domestic origins of Norway’s CCS policy. In fact, some informants reported that the 
CCS foreign policy is a result of the Mongstad projects in the sense that the deliberate CCS foreign policy would not 
have been implemented if it were not for the government’s involvement in the TCM and CCM. A suggested 
explanation is that the foreign policy programme was to prove the international legitimacy of the Mongstad projects; 
if no international support for CCS, the case for the TCM-CCM projects and the North Sea as a regional CO2 
deposit would fall.  
 
3.4 Making a fit within the climate political room of maneuvering: CCS as development assistance, the ODA track 
and the Norway and EEA Grants 
 
The diffusion of the CCS agenda into Norway's development cooperation and regional EU policies, illustrates an 
important aspect of the toolkit available to Norwegian climate policymakers. The 2008 CCS international action 
plan states that “ODA funding should be the principle source of funding” for Norway’s CCS external CCS activities 
[52]. Parliament in the Climate Settlement, and later the MFA, found Norway’s CCS foreign policy to fit within the 
mandate for ODA funding, which is requires the economic development and welfare of developing countries to be a 
main objective of the effort. The prevailing argument is that of the importance of CCS as a global mitigation option 
and the reduced costs related to CCS implementation in developing countries. There are also examples where the 
MPE’s and the MFA have co-funded international CCS activities over the past years.  
The use of ODA funding was also intended to underpin the efforts made to have CCS included into the CDM. 
These resources were in particular allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and certain developing countries countries, like 
South Africa and Indonesia, in line with the priorities of the international CCS action plan. Some informants have 
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emphasized this international turn as a consequence of Norway’s overall climate policy in line with principle cost-
effectiveness under a globally binding regime with a price on emissions. In a CCS context, it would imply that more 
CO2 could be sequestered at lowered cost beyond Norway. To date, no full-scale CCS projects have been 
materialized with the use of Norwegian funding.  
ODA funding for international CCS efforts, together with the explicit priority given CCS under the 2009-2014 
Norway and EEA Grants, underlines a willingness by Norwegian policymakers to allocate significant financial 
resources for the purpose of a global CCS rollout. The two mentioned sources of funding have in common not only 
that they are administered by the MFA, but also that their respective budgetary ceilings are given based on set 
criteria. Consequently, policymakers direct allocations towards prioritized policy areas within the predefined ODA 
and EEA budget lines. The ODA budget ceiling is dictated by overall development policy goals and the EEA 2009-
2014 cap was a result of negotiations with the EU. Given their mandate to prioritize CCS, Norwegian policymakers 
effectively made their cause within the ODA and EEA resource pools. This in turn materialized into the various 
externally oriented CCS activities described above, funded by the Norwegian government.  
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
The ambition of this study was twofold; to map Norway’s CCS foreign policy portfolio, to explain it as a choice 
of climate policy means, and to do so with FPA as the analytical method of choice. From the outside-in perspective, 
the international climate regime as a framework condition for Norwegian CCS foreign policymaking was 
emphasized. Together with insights from the literature on Norwegian climate policy, the bureaucratic politics model 
was used to identify actors and to project domestic interest formation from the inside-out perspective. As we have 
seen, Norway’s CCS policies have evolved over time within a dynamic climate political room of maneuvering 
influenced by internal and external drivers. Between international and domestic restraints and obligations, winning 
coalitions utilize what is feasible in order to harmonize the potentially conflicting agendas of Norway’s climate 
political Gordian knot. From these accounts, the following take-home messages stand out: 
From the outside-in perspective, this is a case where the state in question does not behave passively towards its 
obligations. Instead, the actor seeks to influence the framework structure. Norway takes a pro-active stance to shape 
the UNFCCC’s attitude towards CCS. This takes place within the regime negotiations directly and also by use of 
other multilateral channels. Norway’s CCS foreign policy portrays a small state with a willingness to flag and 
accommodate its interest within the climate regime.  
From the inside-out perspective, Norway’s CCS foreign policy serves to illustrate how “all politics is local.” 
This externally directed policy, a climate change mitigation policy in this case, mirrors national concerns. The 
present findings suggest that the foreign policy pillar of Norway’s CCS efforts functioned to legitimize the on-going 
domestic efforts. From the prevailing economic perspective of global cost-effectiveness too, building momentum for 
CCS in less cost intensive environments makes sense given the relatively high costs of implementation in Norway.  
Although Norway’s domestic CCS policy during the 1990s and 2000s emphasized solutions to the domestic “gas 
power conflict”, it is now the international and technology R&D oriented pillars that constitute Norway’s most 
active CCS chapters. This is noteworthy as the latter at first derived from the national agenda.  It adds to the 
narrative of how CCS in Norway went from being a national solution to a largely national political problem, to 
become a global technical solution to a global problem – and perhaps in part to legitimize the government’s 
significant involvement in the Mongstad projects?  
At the bureaucratic level, this study has highlighted how national agents, notably the MPE (and implicitly its 
sector specific constituency), followed along from domestic politics and into the foreign policy domain. Together 
with the OPM, the MPE’s take on CCS entered the realms of multilateral climate change negotiations, development 
policy, regional cooperation and other diplomatic spheres. With the extensive use of ODA and EEA funds for the 
purpose of CCS foreign policy, we have seen how tapping into “no-regret” budget lines may effectively mobilize 
resources for novel purposes. It underlines how the technology R&D and ODA arenas may serve multiple policy 
goals, including climate policy targets.  
The present study has attempted to illuminate the choice of CCS foreign policy as climate policy in Norway. But 
to better understand this case, further contributions are needed. First, as focus here has been on government agencies 
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as agents, the roles of political parties, individual decision-makers and other domestic actors, like NGOs, have not 
been explored in depth. In particular, how may the prominent presence of CCS foreign policy in parliament’s 2008 
and 2012 cross-political climate settlements be explained on such terms? Second, previous studies have described 
the development of Norway’s domestic CCS policy as a one with clear path dependency effects [8]. Examination 
along a similar line of reasoning may yield fruitful also for the foreign policy case.
 Finally, the effects of Norway’s CCS foreign policy have not been covered in the above. A further inquiry into 
the effects of Norway’s CCS foreign policy is recommended. At a glance, indications point to a higher degree of 
acceptance for CCS as a legitimate mitigation options at the international level. However, the mitigation effects, in 
terms avoided emissions, from international CCS deployment is marginal to date. A further analysis of the actual 
effects of Norway’s CCS foreign policy would be timely. Put to the extreme in light of the climate political Gordian 
knot, is this merely aimed to implement measures that contribute to Norway’s climate political credibility by the 
means of diplomacy, R&D funding and ODA spun around the “promise of CCS”? Or is this a comprehensive 
strategic approach to mitigation action that will yield tangible results in due time?  
Finally, the fact that Norway’s entire CCS policy now is at crossroads should be of our interest. The current 
situation indicates that the historical main engine of the CCS agenda in Norway, CCS from natural gas power plants, 
is less relevant. We have instead seen how the external and technology branches of Norway’s CCS policy have 
become more important. It is at the time of writing undecided how the government will follow-up on its 
commitment to materialize a full-scale CCS project by 2020. The question remains as to what motivations will guide 
Norway’s CCS policies in light of the two-degrees target and other explicit and implicit policy goals.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author is grateful for the contributions and comments provided by Anna Barnwell, Amanda Larimore and 
Gunnar Fermann to draft versions of this text. The author also extends thanks to the informants who kindly shared 
from their professional experiences and expert analyses.  
 
 
References 
 
[1] O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, 
P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel, J.C. Minx, Climate 
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in: I.P.o.C.C. IPCC (Ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2014. 
[2] I.E.A. IEA, Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage, IEA, International Energy Agency, Paris, 2013. 
[3] Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute, The Global Status of CCS february 2014, Global Carbon Capture 
and Storage Institute, Docklands, Australia, 2014. 
[4] G. Fermann, Utenrikspolitikk og norsk krisehåndtering, Cappelen Damm akademisk, [Oslo], 2013. 
[5] A. Tjernshaugen, O.S. Langhelle, Technology as political glue: CCS in Norway, in: J. Meadowcroft, O.S. 
Langhelle (Eds.) Caching the carbon: the politics and policy of carbon capture and storage, Edward Elgar 
Limited, Cheltenham, 2009, pp. s. 98-124. 
[6] J.B. Skjærseth, International regimes and Norway's environmental policy: crossfire and coherence, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2004. 
[7] S.M. Tellmann, The constrained influence of discourses: the case of Norwegian climate policy, Environmental 
Politics, 21 (2012) 734-752. 
[8] A. Tjernshaugen, The growth of political support for CO2 capture and storage in Norway, Environmental 
      Politics, 20 (2011) 227-245. 
[9] S. Kasa, Klimakamp blir innovasjonspolitikk, in: J. Hanson, S. Kasa, O. Wicken (Eds.) Energirikdommens 
paradokser, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2011, pp. 153-170. 
[10] B. Praetorius, C. von Stechow, Electricity hap versus climate change: electricty politcs and the potential role of 
CCS in Germany, in: J. Meadowcroft, O.S. Langhelle (Eds.) Caching the Carbon: The Politics and Policy of 
Carbon Capture and Storage, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 2009, pp. 125-157. 
 Jo-Kristian S. Roettereng /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  6927 – 6944 6941
[11] M. Pollak, S.J. Phillips, S. Vajjhala, Carbon capture and storage policy in the United States: A new coalition 
endeavors to change existing policy, Global Environmental Change, 21 (2011) 313-323. 
[12] K. van Alphen, M.P. Hekkert, W.C. Turkenburg, Comparing the development and deployment of carbon 
capture and storage technologies in Norway, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and the United States–An 
innovation system perspective, Energy Procedia, 1 (2009) 4591-4599. 
[13] A. Ishii, O. Langhelle, Toward policy integration: Assessing carbon capture and storage policies in Japan and 
Norway, Glob. Environ. Change-Human Policy Dimens., 21 (2011) 358-367. 
[14] D. Sinclair, N. Gunningham, CCS in Australia: From political posturing to political potential, in: J. 
Meadowcroft, O. Langhelle (Eds.) Caching the Carbon: The Politics of Carbon Capture and Storage, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2009. 
[15] H. de Coninck, Trojan horse or horn of plenty? Reflections on allowing CCS in the CDM, Energy Policy, 36 
(2008) 929-936. 
[16] P.J. Vergragt, CCS in the Netherlands: glass half empty or half full?, in: J. Meadowcroft, O.S. Langhelle (Eds.) 
Caching the Carbon: The Politics and Policy of Carbon Capture and Storage, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, Cheltenham, 2009, pp. 186-210. 
[17] K. Bäckstrand, J. Meadowcroft, M. Oppenheimer, The politics and policy of carbon capture and storage: 
Framing an emergent technology, Global Environmental Change, 21 (2011) 275-281. 
[18] J. Meadowcroft, O.S. Langhelle, Caching the carbon: the politics and policy of carbon capture and storage, 
Edward Elgar Limited, Cheltenham, 2009. 
[19] J.C. Stephens, A. Hansson, Y. Liu, H. de Coninck, S. Vajjhala, Characterizing the international carbon capture 
and storage community, Global Environmental Change, 21 (2011) 379-390. 
[20] G.C. Unruh, Escaping carbon lock-in, Energy Policy, 30 (2002) 317-325. 
[21] M. Jaccard, J. Tu, Show some enthusiasm, but not too much: carbon capture and storage development prospects 
in China, Global Environmental Change, 21 (2011) 402-412. 
[22] M. Román, Carbon capture and storage in developing countries: A comparison of Brazil, South Africa and 
        India, Global Environmental Change, 21 (2011) 391-401. 
[23] P.G. Harris, Environmental change and foreign policy: theory and practice, Routledge, New York, 2009. 
[24] C. Hill, The changing politics of foreign policy, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 2003. 
[25] A.L. George, A. Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2005. 
[26] P.B. Evans, H.K. Jacobson, R.D. Putnam, Double-edged diplomacy: international bargaining and domestic 
politics, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. 
[27] R.D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization, 
42 (1988) 427-460. 
[28] O.R. Young, Global governance: drawing insights from the environmental experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1997. 
[29] O.S. Stokke, Regimes as Governance Systems, in: O.R. Young (Ed.) Global Governance: Drawing Insights    
from the Environmental Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 27-63. 
[30] S.D. Krasner, International regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1983. 
[31] J. Hovi, D.F. Sprinz, A. Underdal, Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time Inconsistency, Domestic   
Politics, International Anarchy, Global Environ. Politics, 9 (2009) 20-39. 
[32] J. Goldstein, R.O. Keohane, Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change, Cornell  
University Press, Ithaca, 1993. 
[33] G. Allison, The Cuban missile crisis at 50: lessons for U.S. foreign policy today, in, The Council on Foreign  
Relations., New York, 2012, pp. S. 11-16. 
[34] S. Winter, V. Lehmann Nielsen, Implementering af politik, Academica, Århus, 2008. 
[35] M. Reitan, Ecological Modernisation and ‘Realpolitik’: Ideas, Interests and Institutions, Environmental Politics,  
7 (1998) 1-26. 
[36] Y. Nilsen, En felles plattform?: norsk oljeindustri og klimadebatten i Norge fram til 1998, Det humanistiske  
fakultet, Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo, 2001. 
[37] S. Kasa, Policy networks as barriers to green tax reform: The case of CO2ಣtaxes in Norway, Environmental  
 Politics, 9 (2000) 104-122. 
6942   Jo-Kristian S. Roettereng /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  6927 – 6944 
[38] C. Hepburn, Carbon trading: A review of the Kyoto mechanisms, Annual Review of Environment and  
Resources, 32 (2007) 375-393. 
[39] S. Oberthür, H.E. Ott, The Kyoto Protocol - International CLimate policy for the 21st Century, Springer Verlag  
Heidelberg, Berlin, 1999. 
[40] Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, Norsk klimapolitikk, [Regjeringen], [Oslo], 2012. 
[41] A. Tjernshaugen, Fossil interests and environmental insitutions: the politics of COೣ capture and storage,  
        University of Oslo, Doctoral dissertation no. 204, Unipub, 2010. 
[42] Stortinget, Innst. S. nr. 273 (1988-1989): Innstilling fra kommunal- og miljøvernkomiteen om miljø og  
utvikling - Norges oppfølging av Verdenskommisjonens rapport, in, Stortinget, Oslo, 1989. 
[43] Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, Norsk klimapolitikk, [Regjeringen], [Oslo], 2007. 
[44] A. Tjernshaugen, Gasskraft: tjue års klimakamp, Pax, Oslo, 2007. 
[45] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Prop. 1 S (2013-2014), (2013). 
[46] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2010). "Regjeringen tilrettelegger for rensing av  
        industriutslipp." Retrieved 3 September, 2014, from http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd- 
       Government/Ministry-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Nyheter-og-   
       pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2009/regjeringen-tilrettelegger-for-rensing-a.html?id=586833. 
[47] Office of the Audtior General of Norway, Dokument 3:14 (2012-2013) Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av statens  
arbeid med CO2-håndtering, in: Riksrevisjonen (Ed.), Oslo, 2013. 
[48] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Fullskala CO2-håndtering, Oslo, Ministry of Petroleum and  
       Energy, St. meld. no.  9 (2010-2011), 2010. 
[49] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009). "High-Level Conference on Climate Change and Technology 
        in Bergen, Norway, on 27-28 May 2009." Retrieved 3 September 2014, from http://www.ccsnorway.no. 
[50] Solberg I Government, Politisk plattform for en regjering utgått av Høyre og Fremskrifttspartiet -  
      "Sundvollenerklæringen", in, Progress Party and Conservative Party, Sundvollen, 2013. 
[51] T. Skogen, Klimapolitikk i Norge og EU - hvor kommer CCS inn?, in: Tekna (Ed.) CO2-Konferansen 2014,  
        Tekna, Trondheim, 2014. 
[52] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, St. Prp. 1 (2008-2009): 6. Handlingsplan for å fremje  
       karbonfangst- og lagring som klimatiltak, in, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oslo, 2008. 
[53] Stortinget, Klimaforliket 2008, in, Stortinget, Oslo, 2008. 
[54] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Voluntary contribution on workshop on carbon capture and  
       storage in geological formations as Clean Development Mechanism project activities, in, Archive 08/01061- 
       203, 2011. 
[55] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, CCS in CDM:  Phase 1 Report, in, Archive no. 08/1061-253,  
       2013. 
[56] Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands, CCS in Southern Africa An assessment of the rationale,  
        possibilities and capacity needs to  nable CO2 capture and storage in Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia, in,     
        2010. 
[57] Norwegian Financial Mechanism - Romania, Memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the  
       Norwegian financial mechanism 2009-2014 between the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of Romania,      
       in: N.F.M.-. Romania (Ed.), 2012. 
[58] Norwegian Financial Mechanism - Poland, Memorandum of Understanding on the implementation of the  
       Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009-2014 between the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Poland, in:  
       N.F.M.-. Poland (Ed.), 2011. 
[59] Norway Grants (2010). "Priority sector: Carbon Capture and Storage." Retrieved 15 January, 2014, from  
        http://eeagrants.org/content/download/6877/84137/version/2/file/Carbon+Capture+and+ 
        Storage+%28CCS%29.pdf. 
[60] Norwegian Financial Mechanism - Czech Republic, Memorandum of Understanding on the implementation of    
       the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009-2014 between the Kingdom of Norway and the Czech Republic,   
        (2011). 
[61] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norsk støtte 2013 til Verdensbankens fond for kapasitetsbygging på  
        CCS i utvklingsland - Støtte til pilotprosjekt i Sør-Afrika, in, Archive no. 11/01124, 2013. 
[62] Norwegian MInistry of Petroleum and Energy, Prosjektrapport internasjonal informasjonsvirksomhet om CO2- 
 Jo-Kristian S. Roettereng /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  6927 – 6944 6943
       håndtering, in, Archive no. 09/304-33, 2013. 
[63] Norwegian MInistry of Petroleum and Energy, Tilsagn om støtte til Bellona for fremme av CO2-håndtering  
       internasjonalt i 2013, in, Archive no. 09/2459, 2013. 
[64] United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Technology Roadmap - Carbon Capture and Storage in  
        Industrial Applications, in, 2011. 
[65] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Karbonfangst- og lagring. Bruk av bistandsmidler., in, Archive no.  
       13/01310-1, 2013. 
[66] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Svarbrev til Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources -  
        Saudi Arabia, in, Archive no. 08/2070-13, 2008. 
[67] United Kingdom Department of Energy and Climate Change, One North Sea Joint Ministerial Statement on  
       Climate Change and Energy Security, in: D.o.E.a.C. Change (Ed.), 2011. 
[68] United States Department of Energy (2014). "U.S.-Norway Conference Focuses on Advancing Carbon Capture  
        and Storage." Retrieved 12 September, 2014, from http://energy.gov/fe/articles/us-norway-conference-focuses- 
        advancing-carbon-capture-and-storage. 
[69] R.o.S. Africa, Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway and the Deputy President of  
       the Republic of South Africa on Climate Change and Energy Issues, in, 2008. 
[70] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2010). "Carbon dioxide capture and storage in  
        geological formations as CDM project activities." Retrieved April 25, 2010, from  
        http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/ccs/index.html. 
[71] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prop. 1 S (2010-2011), in, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2010. 
[72] ElementEnergy, One North Sea - A study into North Sea cross-border CO2 transport and storage, 2010. 
[73] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014). "Hva er EØS-midlene?". Retrieved 10 September, 2014, from   
        http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/sub/europaportalen/eos-midlene/hva-er-eos-midlene.html?id=685567. 
[74] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prop. 1 S (2011-2012), in, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2011. 
[75] Carbon Sequesteration Leadership Forum (2010). "A global response to the challenge of climate change."  
        Retrieved April 8, 2010, from http://www.cslforum.org/index.html. 
[76] G8 Gleneagles 2005, Gleneagles Plan of Action Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development,  
        in, Group of Eight, Gleneagles, UK, 2005. 
[77] European Commission (2011). "EEPR - CO2 Capture and Storage." Retrieved 28 May, 2011, from   
        http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2010_eepr_brochure_co2_en.pdf. 
[78] European Commission (2011). "NER 300." Retrieved 27 May, 2011, from  
        http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/lowcarbon/ner300_en.htm. 
[79] D.H. Claes, P. Frisvold, CCS and the European Union: Magic bullett or pure magic?, in: J. Meadowcroft, O.   
        Langhelle (Eds.) Caching the Carbon: The politics of carbon capture and storage, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,  
        UK, 2009. 
[80] N.H. Stern, The economics of climate change: The Stern review, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  
       2007. 
[81] nternational Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage, OECD/ IEA, Paris, 2008. 
[82] B. Metz, O. Davidson, H. de Coninck, M. Loos, L. Meyer, IPCC special report on carbon dioxide capture and  
       storage, in, Published for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [by] Cambridge University Press,  
       Cambridge, 2005, pp. X, 431 s. 
[83] M. Pollak, E.J. Wilson, Risk governance for geological storane of CO2 under the Clean Development  
       Mechanism, Climate Policy, 9 (2009) 71-87. 
[84] I. Vormedal, The Influence of Business and Industry NGOs in the Negotiation of the Kyoto Mechanisms: the  
      Case of Carbon Capture and Storage in the CDM, Global Environ. Politics, 8 (2008) 36-65. 
[85] T. Dixon, G. Leamon, P. Zakkour, L. Warren, CCS Projects as Kyoto Protocol CDM Activities, Energy  
      Procedia, 37 (2013) 7596-7604. 
[86] T. Dixon, International legal and regulatory developments for carbon dioxide capture and storage: from the  
        London Convention to the Clean Development Mechanism, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical  
        Engineers Part a-Journal of Power and Energy, 223 (2009) 293-297. 
[87] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2010). "Report of the Subsidiary Body for  
       Scientific and Technological Advice on its thirty-first session, held in Copenhagen from 8 to 12 December  
       2009." Retrieved April 21, 2010, from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbsta/eng/08.pdf. 
6944   Jo-Kristian S. Roettereng /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  6927 – 6944 
[88] Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute, Global CCS Institute submission to: the European Commission's  
        consultative communication on the future of carbon capture and storage in Europe, in, Global Carbon Capture  
       and Storage institute, Canberra, Australia, 2013. 
[89] J. Toleffson (2012). "Coalition launches effort on ‘short-lived’ climate pollutants." Nature News Blog.  
      Retrieved 10 September, 2014, from http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/02/coalition-launches-effort-on-short- 
       lived-climate-pollutants.html. 
[90] Ritzau (2012). "Danmark går solo for at få klimavennlige lande." Retrieved 11 September, 2014, from  
      http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2012/10/19/1019081054.htm. 
[91] Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment (2013). "Ambisiøs videreføring av norsk klima- og  
      skogsatsing." Retrieved 15 January, 2014, from  
       http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kld/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2013/ambisios-videreforing-av-norsk-     
       klima--og.html?id=745308. 
[92] L. Sølhusvik, Kristin Halvorsen: gjennomslag, Cappelen Damm, [Oslo], 2013. 
[93] J. Stoltenberg (2007, March 18 2010). "Statsministerens nyttårstale 2007." Retrieved 18 December, 2010, from  
       http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/ 
       2007-4/statsministerens-nyttarstale-2007.html?id=440349. 
[94] K.B. Alstadheim, J. Stoltenberg, Klimaparadokset: Jens Stoltenberg om vår tids største utfordring, Aschehoug,  
       Oslo, 2010. 
[95] Statoil (2009). "CO2 Masterplan Mongstad." Retrieved 8 April, 2011, from  
       http://www.statoil.com/no/NewsAndMedia/News/2009/Downloads/CO2 Masterplan Mongstad norsk.pdf. 
[96] Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2006). "Energiverk Mongstad og avtale mellom staten og Statoil  
       om CO2-håndtering." Retrieved 8 May, 2011, from  
       http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/oed/prm/2006/0143/ddd/pdfv/296763-internettomtale_-    
       energiverket_pa_mongstad_og_avtale_mello.pdf. 
[97] Stortinget (2014). "Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av statens arbeid med CO2-håndtering." Retrieved 19 May,  
       2014, from https://stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Saker/Sak/?p=58007. 
[98] E. Hovden, G. Lindseth, Discourses in Norwegian Climate Policy - National action of thinking globally  
       Political Studies, 52 (2004) 63-81. 
[99] Norweegian Ministry of the Environment, St. meld. nr. 54 Norsk klimapolitikk, in, Ministry of the  
       Environment, Oslo, 2001. 
[100] Norweegian Ministry of the Environment, Norsk klimapolitikk, [Regjeringen], [Oslo], 2012. 
[101] Gassnova (2013). "Mongstad skrinlegges." Retrieved 15 January, 2014, from  
         http://www.gassnova.no/no/Sider/Mongstad-skrinlegges.aspx. 
[102] J.G. Støre (2011). "Energi- og klimautfordringen: Paradokser, muligheter, løsninger . ”Gi gass”.  
         Oljeindustriens Landsforenings årskonferanse, Oslo 20. oktober 2011." from  
          http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-ii/ud/taler-og-    
         artikler/2011/energi_gass.html?regj_oss=1&id=661233. 
 
Appendix 
List of informants:  
Informant A: Senior official of the Stoltenberg II government 
Informant B: Senior official of the Stoltenberg II government 
Informant C: Representative of Bellona Foundation 
Informant D: Senior official of the Ministry of Climate and Environment  
Informant E: Official of the Ministry of Climate and Environment  
Informant F: Senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Informant G: Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Informant H: Senior Representative of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
Informant I: Representative of SINTEF Energi AS 
Informant J: Senior official of the Solberg I government  
Informant K: Senior official of the Stoltenberg II government 
Informant I: Senior official of an industrial company.  
